The intelligence reform agenda: what next? by Carl Ungerer
Funding, organisational and legislative changes to the six national agencies 
of the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) since 2001 have placed 
intelligence at the forefront of our national security effort. The rapid growth 
in human and fi nancial resources devoted to intelligence collection and 
assessment, and the expansion of powers given to individual agencies 
refl ects a political judgment, both in Australia and in similar countries 
overseas, that intelligence is now the most effective tool in the struggle 
against new security threats such as transnational terrorism. 
But four years after the government-commissioned Inquiry into Australian 
Intelligence Agencies (the Flood review) the reform agenda has stalled. 
In some ways, this was to be expected. The intelligence community has 
undergone the most intense period of scrutiny since most of these agencies 
were fi rst established after World War II. A moment of refl ection and 
consolidation was probably unavoidable. 
As the Flood Report itself acknowledged, the AIC needs to remain dynamic 
in the face of a changing security environment. One of the report’s main 
recommendations was that the intelligence community should be subject 
to external review every fi ve to seven years. The Rudd Government has 
inherited an intelligence community that is well-resourced, better integrated 
and more capable than at any time in its history. But it also lacks overall 
direction and has been bruised by recent intelligence inquiries. 
This paper offers an assessment of the intelligence reform agenda and 
proposes some further steps towards restructuring the AIC and its activities 
to meet the national security challenges of the next decade. 
Reform redux
The events of September 2001, and the subsequent acknowledgment in 
defence and security circles that globalised terrorism had moved from the 
periphery of the international order to the front rank of national security 
threats, provided the primary rationale for the recent reforms to the 
intelligence agencies.
But it was the intelligence failure over the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction programs in 2003, and the resulting public reaction, that 
forced governments in Canberra, London and Washington to institute major 
public inquiries.
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In each case, the inquiries found that the intelligence services suffered from 
a number of systemic problems. In London, the Butler Report found serious 
weaknesses in both the assessment process and the political representation 
of intelligence material to the public. In Washington, a US Senate Committee 
report found that the intelligence community there suffered from ‘groupthink’ 
and had ‘overstated’ and ‘mischaracterised’ the available evidence. In 
Australia, the problem was described as one of ‘policy running strong’. 
Across the allied ‘four-eyes’ community (Australia, Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) the intelligence reform agenda has been 
remarkably similar. The major reforms have focused on four main areas: 
• Structure – reorganising the institutional framework for intelligence         
 gathering, assessment and dissemination, especially through the   
 creation of joint analysis teams on terrorism. 
• Resourcing and recruitment – increasing the funding available for   
 human and technical resources. 
• Oversight – providing greater accountability measures, especially   
 through the expansion of parliamentary committee systems. 
• Legislation – particularly in the area of increasing counter-terrorism       
 powers for domestic security agencies, but also updating and                
 extending laws regarding sedition, the proscription of terrorist   
 organisations and the use of electronic interception.    
The nett result has been a strengthening of the role of intelligence in relation 
to foreign and security policy. In Australia, the National Security Committee 
of Cabinet can now rely on a deeper and broader reserve of information on 
which to base policy decisions. But there are still clear limits on the value of 
intelligence to policy makers. Intelligence can help to colour policy choices, 
but it can not make them.   
After the Flood
The tabling of the Flood Report in July 2004 provided an opportunity for the 
Australian Government to make a number of changes to the way in which 
the AIC operates. The most obvious change has been the growth in the 
funding available to the six national agencies, see Table 1. The budget for 
the Australian Security Intelligence Agency (ASIO), for example, has grown 
from a low of just $69 million in 2002 to over $441 million last year. Further 
growth is expected as ASIO moves towards a full complement of 1,860 staff 
by 2010–11. The Offi ce of National Assessments’ (ONA) budget has doubled 
in the space of just three years. 
Across the board, Australia now spends in excess of $1.3 billion each year on 
intelligence. And the cost is growing.  
Table 1: Intelligence funding by agency 2001–2008
2001–02 
$m
2007–08 
$m
% 
increase
ASIO 69 441 539%
ASIS 54 161 198%
ONA 7 36 414%
Defence Intelligence 
Group (DSD, DIO, DIGO)
311 
(2003-04)
431 38.6%
The previous government had committed an additional $185 million over the 
next four years towards strengthening the intelligence agencies as part of 
the forward budget estimates. Although no cost-benefi t analysis has been 
conducted on the appropriateness or effi ciency of our current spending on 
intelligence, it is worth noting that the total funding for the AIC has increased 
at a pace faster than some of our allied intelligence partners. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, total funding for intelligence has increased by only 
68% since 2004, albeit off a higher base.   
The main purpose of the new funding has been to enhance Australia’s 
capacity to collect and analyse intelligence information from around the world 
and to improve domestic counter-terrorism efforts. 
The bulk of this funding has been directed towards recruiting new analysts 
and intelligence offi cers in ONA, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service 
(ASIS) and ASIO, particularly those with foreign language skills. As a result of 
the disinvestment in intelligence and security throughout much of the 1990s, 
this new funding has been necessary to create a larger pool of analysts 
conversant in the politics of our region. 
Particular attention has been given to improving analytical capacity on 
emerging security threats such as transnational terrorism as well as 
unique issues such as pandemic diseases and climate change. Around 
70% of the current collection work among the three defence intelligence 
agencies is devoted to counter-terrorism and supporting Australian military 
operations overseas. 
The intelligence reform agenda: What next? 3
National intelligence machinery
The Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) comprises: 
Offi ce of National Assessments (ONA) – an all-source intelligence assessment 
agency reporting directly to the Prime Minister and senior Cabinet Ministers. 
ONA was established in 1977 by an Act of Parliament. The Director-General of 
ONA is the nominal head of the AIC. 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) – modelled on the British SIS or 
MI6, ASIS is a foreign human intelligence (humint) collection agency based in 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) – created by the Chifl ey 
Government after World War II, ASIO is responsible for the security of 
Australians and Australian interests including protecting the country from 
terrorism, and acts of foreign interference and espionage.  
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) – is Australia’s signals intelligence agency 
responsible for the interception of foreign communications and for providing 
advice on Australia’s information security. 
Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) – provides high-level analysis and 
advice to the Defence Minister and Cabinet on military capabilities and support 
for deployed forces.  
Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) – working closely with 
intelligence partners overseas, DIGO provides a wide range of geospatial 
services including mapping and photography to support military operations. 
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Although the Flood inquiry found that the AIC suffered from ‘a number of 
failings’, his report stopped short of recommending any major structural 
changes to the AIC.   
The government at the time accepted Flood’s recommendations, except the 
proposal to change the name of the Offi ce of National Assessments. But 
not all changes have been implemented with the same enthusiasm. Some 
of the reforms on the operations of the AIC, for example, have been met 
with polite indifference. 
ONA was a particular focus for the inquiry. As the peak assessment 
agency reporting to the Prime Minister, Flood recommended that ONA be 
given additional responsibilities for ‘community coordination’ through the 
establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Coordination Committee (FICC) 
and it was encouraged to produce more national assessments on issues of 
strategic importance to Australia. 
These reforms were modest but sensible enough and refl ected the judgment 
that the AIC continued to lack suffi cient coordination across the agencies. 
The reforms were also intended to lessen the natural instinct of most 
intelligence agencies to hoard information. 
The extent to which these particular reforms have been effective remains an 
open question. Clearly, the creation of all-agency assessment teams, such 
as the National Threat Assessment Centre in ASIO, and the interoperability 
between collectors and assessors has improved working relationships 
between individuals and agencies. But there was nothing revolutionary in the 
Flood proposals. And the creation of the FICC simply formalised processes 
that were already in place.
In other areas, structural rigidities and entrenched cultural differences 
remain an impediment to a more nimble and fl exible intelligence apparatus. 
Despite improvements in information technology and the creation of virtual 
workspaces for intelligence offi cers, the proposed strategy for IT connectivity 
across the AIC remains incomplete. And it is not clear that the national 
assessments process, including the provision of contestable advice, is 
operating in the way that the Flood Report envisaged.  
The end result of the Flood inquiry is that the Australian Intelligence 
Community is larger and better resourced, but it looks and acts remarkably 
similar to the way it did in 2001. In particular, the continuing division between 
foreign and domestic intelligence appears increasingly at odds with the nature 
and evolution of national security threats. 
And despite some improvements in cooperation and communication across 
the community as a whole, there is still no primary point of contact for the 
Prime Minister or the public on intelligence matters. 
One of the principal dangers is that the new funding and resources given to 
the AIC have created an expectation that there are intelligence solutions to 
the full range of national security problems confronting Australia, from the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemicals weapons to home-grown 
terrorism. As several former offi cials have noted, such expectations are not 
valid. But with an investment of over $1 billion per annum and growing, the 
public will want to know that they are getting good value for money. 
Ideas for change
Further incremental adjustments to the AIC will not be suffi cient to meet the 
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expectations of either policy makers or the public. Nor will simply spending 
more money on intelligence. The new national security environment, in which 
threats to Australian interests can emerge quickly and without warning, 
requires a fundamental rethink about the structure and functions of the 
intelligence community. 
With the reform process in Australia currently on hold, Canberra has 
fallen behind its allied intelligence partners in both the UK and the US. 
Governments in London and Washington have implemented extensive 
changes to their intelligence agencies in the past four years. Several of 
these changes, including the creation of a central position in government for 
intelligence coordination, have been on the agenda for many decades. 
By adapting some of these changes to Australian circumstances, we can 
begin to address the structural problems in the AIC. Although some of these 
ideas have been suggested before, including by ASPI in Strategic Insight 6 
– The Agenda for Intelligence Reform, the current review of national security 
arrangements provides the ideal opportunity to lock in the reforms necessary 
for the national security challenges ahead.   
Centralise coordination
Since ONA was established in 1977, the Director General has been the 
nominal head of the AIC. This position derives from ONA’s responsibilities 
under the legislation to ‘coordinate the foreign intelligence activities that 
Australia engages in’. But the imprecise language in the ONA Act, and the 
lack of executive powers to direct Australia’s intelligence effort, has meant 
that ONA has never acted as the central focus point for the AIC as a whole. 
As a billion dollar enterprise, the need for a central AIC coordination function 
has never been more critical. This could be achieved in one of two ways. 
First, the ONA Act could be amended to give greater clarity to the role and 
responsibilities of the Director General. Alternatively, the coordination task 
could be given to the proposed new National Security Adviser. The latter 
option is preferable as it would avoid the problem of having ONA as both a 
player on the fi eld and the referee. 
In either case, the most appropriate model for this position would be the 
current UK system, in which the Permanent Secretary for Intelligence, 
Security and Resilience is responsible to the Prime Minister for advice on 
resourcing issues across the community as well as being the chair of the 
national assessment process. Combining responsibility for both budgets and 
assessments in Australia would improve coordination within government and 
with overseas intelligence partners.      
The fi rst task of the new position would be to write a national intelligence 
strategy. This would need to be done simultaneously with the proposed 
national security statement and the Defence White Paper review. The 
strategy should clearly spell out how the AIC can work to meet the 
government’s foreign and security policy priorities. This should be a public 
document, and regular updates provided as external circumstances change. 
Combine strategic, security and police intelligence 
The AIC has made some progress in combining the collection and 
assessment functions of various agencies, particularly in the context of 
military operations overseas. The ‘fusion’ of intelligence and warfi ghting 
in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, has had an important force 
multiplier effect.
The concept of ‘fusion’ should now be applied across the wider security 
community. The task would be to devise a strategy to bring the AIC closer to 
the other government agencies, both state and federal, with an associated 
intelligence function. A growing list of government and non-government 
agencies including the police, immigration, customs and the private sector 
have important national security functions but remain largely outside the work 
of the AIC. And it is mostly local and state government agencies that are the 
frontline ‘fi rst responders’ in the event of a major security incident. So defi ning 
the ‘intelligence community’ more broadly is a necessary step towards 
prosecuting a comprehensive approach to national security. 
Improve training and education
Each agency of the AIC has its own specifi c requirements for training and 
education. The skills required of a strategic analyst in ONA, for example, 
are different from the technical collection activities of Defence Signals 
Directorate (DSD).  
Although the introduction of new courses across the AIC, for both new staff 
and mid-career offi cials, has improved the overall quality of the AIC’s output, 
the community would still benefi t from a dedicated intelligence college that 
would act as the focal point for the training needs of collectors, assessors 
and managers. 
As the distinction between collection and assessment continues to blur, 
intelligence offi cers will need to have a better understanding of each other’s 
tradecraft. An early priority for the college would be the development of new 
analytic methodologies and management strategies. In particular, the recent 
growth of the AIC has created challenges for professional development and 
education of senior managers.
In an effort to limit start-up costs, the intelligence college could be 
co-located within an existing university campus. Courses would necessarily 
be of short-duration but might have articulation pathways towards degree 
accreditation. Previous estimates have suggested that a ‘teaching’ faculty of 
around a dozen people with sixty to eighty students would cost approximately 
$4 million per annum. This investment would represent less than 1% of the 
AIC’s current budget.  
Increase accountability, oversight and public engagement
In recent years, the AIC has taken several steps towards improved 
accountability and oversight. All six agencies of the AIC are now covered 
by the amended provisions of the Intelligence Services Act 2001. The offi ce 
of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security has increased in line 
with the growth of the AIC. And the establishment of the Joint Committee 
on Intelligence and Security has enhanced the role of the Parliament in 
examining aspects of the agencies. 
But these reforms fall short of a more robust and open accountability 
regime. Only ASIO is required to provide an unclassifi ed annual report to 
Parliament. This requirement should be extended to all AIC agencies. And 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee should be given additional responsibilities 
and resources for examining the work of the AIC beyond budgets and the 
listing of terrorist organisations. Similar committees in the United States and 
Britain have greater powers to conduct enquires and can operate under 
conditions of secrecy. There is no reason why the Australian Parliament 
should not be the same. 
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Public engagement with the AIC is still limited. The contrast between the 
websites of the CIA in America and ONA in Australia could not be clearer. A 
new relationship between the AIC and the Australian public should be built on 
the basis of greater information sharing and more open communication. As a 
fi rst step, the Director General of ONA should provide an annual statement on 
international strategic developments and their implications for Australia.
Another important aspect of a revised public engagement strategy will be 
how the AIC deals with the private sector. Leveraging the expertise and 
technological innovation of the business community requires a stronger 
commitment to incorporating senior executives into national security planning. 
In addition to ASIO, other agencies of the AIC should have a business 
relations unit. And a regular, structured forum between the CEOs and 
heads of the AIC would improve communication on issues such as critical 
infrastructure protection, research and development and technology to 
support intelligence operations.
Conclusion
Australia’s national security architecture needs to adapt to the twenty-fi rst 
century. Born of a different era and designed for a different set of security 
threats, the intelligence community has been reluctant to move quickly into 
the new security environment. The reform agenda of the past few years has 
delivered more money and more people but little in the way of substantive 
change to the structure and operations of the AIC.   
The AIC occupies a unique place among the instruments of foreign and 
security policy. And it will be an integral component of the government’s 
policy response to Australia’s future national security challenges. Further 
reforms to the coordination mechanisms, community engagement, education, 
training and accountability regimes will ensure that the AIC can continue to 
play a central role in Australia’s national security.  
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